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Little is known regarding the types and frequencies of contact that exist between farms and 11 
which of these may act as pathogen transmission routes; however it is likely that farms 12 
demonstrate considerable heterogeneity in such contacts. In this cross-sectional study, we 13 
explored the direct and indirect contact types and frequencies that exist between cattle farms 14 
within a region, focusing on potential routes of pathogen transmission. The owners/managers of 15 
56 farms located in a 10km by 10km study area in north-west England were administered an 16 
interview-based questionnaire between June and September 2005. Information was obtained 17 
relating to contact types and frequencies, including those involving animal movements, 18 
equipment sharing between farms and any contractors or companies visiting the farms.  19 
The data was explored using hierarchical cluster analysis and network analysis.  There was 20 
considerable variation between farms arising from different contact types.  Some networks 21 
exhibited great connectivity, incorporating approximately 90% of the farms interviewed in a 22 
single component, whilst other networks were more fragmented, with multiple small 23 
components (sets of connected farms not linked with other farms). A range of factors 24 
influencing contact between farms were identified. For example, contiguous farms were more 25 
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likely to be linked via other contacts, such as sharing of equipment, direct farm to farm animal 26 
movements and use of the same livestock dealers (p<0.001, p=0.02 and p=0.1, respectively).   27 
The frequency of contacts was also investigated; it is likely that the amount of contact a farm 28 
receives from a company or contractor and whether or not biosecurity is performed after contact 29 
would impact on disease transmission potential.  We found considerable heterogeneity in 30 
contact frequency and that many company and contractor personnel undertook little biosecurity. 31 
These findings lead to greater understanding of inter-farm contact and may aid development 32 
of appropriate biosecurity practices and control procedures, and inform mathematical modelling 33 
of infectious diseases. 34 
 35 
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1.  Introduction 44 
 45 
Infectious disease transmission at the individual, herd and farm level relies on some form of 46 
contact, either direct or indirect.  Veterinary texts published in the early 1900’s recognised a 47 
cause and effect relationship between animal contact and disease (Anderson, 1998) and as early 48 
as the mid-eighteenth century, livestock producers recognised animal movements as important 49 
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routes for the spread of disease (Woolhouse and Donaldson, 2001).  Many diseases, such as 50 
bovine tuberculosis and foot and mouth disease (FMD) are likely to be spread by these 51 
movements (Gibbens et al., 2001; Gilbert et al., 2005; Woolhouse et al., 2005); this was clearly 52 
demonstrated during the early phase of the 2001 FMD outbreak in the UK (Ortiz-Pelaez et al., 53 
2006).  Other contacts may also result in transmission of infectious agents, including sharing of 54 
equipment, movement of people and vehicles and contact over/through fences with 55 
neighbouring stock; it has also been reported that wildlife and even wind can play a role in 56 
transmission between contiguous or proximate premises (Mikkelsen et al., 2003; Woodroffe et 57 
al., 2006).  58 
Often there is little knowledge of what contacts (direct and indirect) exist between farms.  As 59 
was highlighted by the FMD outbreak in the UK in 2001, local risk kernels are often used to 60 
model local transmission, as details of contacts between farms are not well known (Woolhouse 61 
and Donaldson, 2001; Webb, 2005).  Studies conducted in The Netherlands, California and New 62 
Zealand have identified and quantified these contacts over time, particularly with regard to the 63 
potential spread of FMD. The number of contacts varies greatly when considering 64 
characteristics such as type of enterprise, size of farm and number of animals on farm. It was 65 
reported in California that there were approximately 11 direct animal contacts and 404 indirect 66 
contacts per farm over a two week period (Bates et al., 2001), which is substantially more than 67 
the 92 direct and indirect contacts per farm seen over the same length of time in the Netherlands 68 
(Nielen et al., 1996).  In comparison, 50 contacts of people, animals and materials were reported 69 
over a 2 week period during a study in New Zealand (Sanson et al., 1993). 70 
Such variability illustrates the structural complexity and heterogeneity of the contacts that 71 
exist between farms, some of which can be represented schematically (Fig. 1).  This could 72 
potentially be described as a ‘network’ of contacts between farms which requires further 73 
exploration.  74 
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Network analysis facilitates investigation of interactions between units of interest (‘nodes’, 75 
e.g. animals or farms) at the population and the individual level and enables identification of key 76 
nodes in terms of the connectivity individuals have within a population (Corner et al., 2003).  By 77 
focusing on the most likely contact types and the most significant individuals within these 78 
networks, it is possible to consider how disease may be transmitted through a population 79 
(Christley et al., 2005).  It has been suggested that farm-level heterogeneity is present for all 80 
animal movement patterns and to presume homogeneity is likely to be unrepresentative of actual 81 
movement patterns (Bigras-Poulin et al., 2006). Furthermore, models that assume random 82 
mixing can overestimate the size of an outbreak and underestimate the initial rate of 83 
transmission (Christley et al., 2005).  Hence, network analysis can play a role in developing 84 
understanding of the topology of potential routes of disease transmission, and consequently may 85 
aid the design of effective surveillance and control programs (Woolhouse et al., 2005). 86 
The aim of this study was to investigate the characteristics of the direct and indirect contact 87 
structure of cattle farms in a region and to explore the nature of such contacts using network 88 
analysis techniques. 89 
 90 
 91 
2.  Materials and methods 92 
 93 
2.1 Study population  94 
 95 
A 10km x 10 km area of north-west England was selected and the owners or managers of all 96 
known cattle farms were contacted by mail and invited to participate in this cross-sectional 97 
observational study.  This area had been used previously in other studies by the University of 98 
Liverpool with good farmer compliance.  Follow up phone calls were made to all farms to 99 
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ascertain willingness to participate. Of those farms whose phone numbers were not available, 100 
visits were assigned to determine farm details and whether participation was possible. Visits to 101 
all willing farms were conducted and questionnaires completed.   102 
 103 
2.2 Questionnaire 104 
 105 
The questionnaire consisted of 191 questions which concentrated on determining the direct 106 
and indirect contacts between farms (a copy of the questionnaire is available on request). This 107 
included questions relating to animal movements on and off the farm and their destinations and 108 
departure points, and questions relating to the sharing of equipment between farms, any 109 
personnel coming on and off the farm and the types and frequencies of companies/contractors 110 
coming onto the farm. Social contacts between farmers were also investigated.   111 
Some questions were asked in regards to current biosecurity practices relating to shared 112 
equipment and companies and contractors visiting the farm.  Attitudes of the interviewees 113 
towards 19 biosecurity practices were also explored; these practices were selected after review 114 
of current practices, sourcing information from peer-reviewed papers, current advice from 115 
various government bodies and grey literature.   116 
The interview-based questionnaires were administered to owners/farm managers during July 117 
– September 2005. All interviews were conducted by the first author. A pilot study involving six 118 
cattle farms outside the study area was completed prior to the main study. 119 
 120 
2.3 On-farm observations 121 
 122 
During visits, maps of each farm were used to gather information regarding contiguous 123 
neighbours and farm area, including additional premises used for stock. Boundaries and fence 124 
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types bordering the farm were noted; boundary fields that were frequented by animals and had 125 
fences which allowed potential contact (e.g. wire fences, gapped hedges) with neighbouring 126 
animals (those owned by other farmers) were recorded. A single fence that was reported to not 127 
permit nose-nose contact (e.g. double-fences, thick hedges) was selected randomly from those 128 
on the main farm and was examined to ascertain the potential for nose-nose contact with 129 
neighbouring stock.   130 
 131 
2.4 Data management and analysis 132 
 133 
The questionnaire was formatted using Verity TeleForm Version 9.1 (Verity Inc) and data 134 
managed using Microsoft Office Access 2003 (Microsoft Corporation). Agglomerative 135 
hierarchical cluster analysis was used to classify or group farms (or farmers) according to animal 136 
movements (direct to slaughterhouse, farm-farm or through markets and dealers), use of 137 
companies and contractors and attitudes to the 19 biosecurity practices. Ward’s clustering 138 
method was used; this results in clusters with the fewest within-cluster sums of squares (based 139 
on squared Euclidean distance) (Sharma, 1996). These groups were compared with regard to the 140 
variables used in the cluster analysis itself and with other farm-level variables using chi-squared 141 
tests (for categorical data) and the Kruskal-Wallis test (for continuous data). These statistical 142 
analyses were performed using SPSS 12.0.1 for Windows (SPSS Inc.).  143 
To examine whether the probability of one contact type was associated with the probability of 144 
another, we used the Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) correlation function in Ucinet 145 
v6.135 (www.analytictech.com/).  This method calculates the similarity between two network 146 
matrices using the Jaccard coefficient (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). One of the matrices is then 147 
randomly permuted using the QAP and the Jaccard coefficient recalculated.  We performed this 148 
permutation 10,000 times in order to compute the proportion of times that the random measure 149 
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is larger than or equal to the observed measure.  All network structures were formed using 150 
Ucinet v6.135 and NetDraw v 2.41 (NetDraw; www.analytictech.com/). 151 
 152 
 153 
3.  Results 154 
 155 
3.1 Response rate 156 
 157 
Questionnaires were completed on 56 out of 81 farms, giving a 68.3% response rate.  Of the 158 
farms not participating, seven had ceased trading or did not have cattle and three were shortly to 159 
cease trading.  One farmer could not be contacted despite several visits and phone calls; 13 160 
declined to participate and one farmer could not make an appointment in the allotted project 161 
time.  Therefore, considering only those farms in the area which owned cattle and would be in 162 
the foreseeable future, a 78.8% compliance rate was achieved.  The three farms that were shortly 163 
to cease trading were excluded as we believed that their general farm contacts might not be 164 
representative of a typical farm in this area.  Excluding those farms that did not have cattle/had 165 
ceased trading, 15 farms remained that were not interviewed.  Of these farms, information solely 166 
regarding enterprise was collected on ten by telephone or via external data sources; six dairy 167 
farms, two mixed cattle farms, one beef farm and one heifer rearing farm declined to participate.  168 
All results reported in the following sections are derived using data obtained from the 56 169 
participating farms and relate to cattle unless otherwise specified.   170 
 171 
3.2 Types of enterprise and alternative livestock species 172 
 173 
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The majority of interviewed farms in the study area were dairy farms (36 farms), with 19 fat-174 
stock farms, 15 suckler herds, eight store-animal producers and three pedigree breeders. Almost 175 
one third of dairy farms had additional cattle enterprises outside of the dairy sector.  The median 176 
size of each farm was 80.3 hectares (range 6 - 2428; Interquartile range (IQR) 48 - 137) and the 177 
median number of cattle per farm was 170 (IQR 104-320). 178 
Eleven farms had other animal enterprises; eight farmed sheep, two produced turkeys and one 179 
kept laying hens. Of the eight farms that owned sheep, five farmers stated that they grazed cattle 180 
on the same pasture at the same time.  181 
  182 
3.3 Types of direct contact 183 
 184 
3.3.1 Animal movements 185 
The most commonly reported mechanism for trading animals was through markets (89% of 186 
farms), followed by trading directly with other farms (73%), through dealers (50%) and to 187 
slaughterhouses (50%). Markets and dealers were used most frequently for the sale, rather than 188 
purchase of animals. Most farms trading with dealers used one dealer only.  In contrast, most 189 
farms purchased animals directly from other farms.  The majority of slaughterhouse movements 190 
were to a plant outside of the study area.     191 
The combined 2-mode (having 2 types of node; farms and other organisations) animal 192 
movement network involving interviewed farms and named markets, dealers and 193 
slaughterhouses incorporated almost all of the farms in the study area into a single network 194 
component (Fig. 2; excludes farm-farm movements).  The network visually exhibited a ‘hub and 195 
spoke’ structure, described as such due to its similarity with the spokes of a wheel surrounding a 196 
centre point or ‘hub’, in this case the local market within the study area.  This market plays an 197 
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important role in connecting the nodes within the network. Although most farms used a single 198 
market, one farm bought and sold stock through 5 different markets. 199 
The 1-mode (one type of node only; farms) animal movement network involving farm-farm 200 
movements appeared substantially different to the previous network (Fig. 3a). This network was 201 
fragmented and involved many movements of animals from farms outside of the study area. 202 
Fragmentation of the network increased when only those animal movements between farms in 203 
the study area were considered (Fig. 3b). 204 
The patterns of animal movements (M) were explored using hierarchical cluster analysis 205 
which suggested three main groups (Table 1). Farms in all groups purchased directly from other 206 
farms and traded with markets and slaughterhouses. Farms in group M1 were solely reliant on 207 
markets for sale of animals and didn’t trade with dealers or sell direct to other farms.  All group 208 
M2 farms used dealers and did not sell directly to other farms. Group M3 farms all sold directly 209 
to other farms and half used dealers. Although an uncommon practice generally, the hiring of 210 
animals onto a farm occurred in M1 and M2 farms, but was not undertaken by farms in M3. 211 
There was no evidence of differences between these groups in terms of hectarage, number of 212 
animals, types of enterprise or in the use of companies or contractors (p>0.1 in all cases). 213 
 214 
3.3.2 Stock on the farm not owned by the farmer 215 
Twenty five percent of interviewed farms responded that they sometimes had other livestock 216 
species living on the farm which were not owned by them. Of these 14 farms, 11 had sheep and 217 
four had cattle from other farms. All of the sheep originated from premises in neighbouring 218 
counties and all except one group of cattle were from locations within the same county but 219 
outside of the study area.  The remaining cattle source was located within the study area. 220 
 221 
3.3.3 Contiguous neighbours and boundary fences  222 
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A proportion of the non nose-nose contact boundary fences were randomly selected and 223 
examined on 43 farms. The selected fences on 19 farms (44%) were assessed to have no contact 224 
possible through them (Fig. 4). Of the fences that allowed contact, over 90% permitted contact 225 
along only 1-20% of their length.  Each farming unit (main holding plus additional premises 226 
with stock) had an average of 7.3 neighbouring farms (median 7, range 1-17) and an average of 227 
7.2 grazing fields with potential neighbouring stock contact (median 7, range 0-24). As some 228 
neighbouring farms did not use perimeter fields for grazing, the average number of neighbours 229 
with potential stock contact was 3.3 (median 3, range 0-10). 230 
 231 
3.4 Types of indirect contact 232 
 233 
3.4.1 Equipment sharing  234 
Forty three percent of farmers stated they shared equipment with other farms, the majority of 235 
farms sharing only one item (63%). Tractors, trailers and wagons were shared most commonly 236 
between farms, followed by machinery for harvesting and ploughing, and muck vehicles. Waste 237 
handling and feeding were nominated as the two most common tasks for which tractors were 238 
utilised. 239 
The 1-mode network arising through sharing of equipment was fragmented and involved 240 
many farms outside the study area and farms within the study area that were not interviewed 241 
(Fig. 5).  This network involved 30 interviewed farms including six that did not nominate 242 
themselves as sharing equipment but that were nominated by other farms as doing so.  Only two 243 
of the relationships between interviewed farms were reciprocal, suggesting considerable 244 
underreporting 245 
Of the 24 farmers that reported sharing equipment, 12 stated that they did not perform any 246 
biosecurity before or after using the items.  Of the remaining 12, five farmers lent items; two 247 
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would clean on return and two would clean before lending the items, only one farmer did both.  248 
Eight farmers reported borrowing equipment from others; five cleaned the items prior to 249 
returning them (one cleaned only one of the three items borrowed) and two before using them; 250 
again one did both.  One farmer lent and borrowed equipment and is therefore included twice. 251 
 252 
3.4.2 Companies and contractors 253 
There was considerable variation between the number of farms visited by each type of 254 
company or contractor and the frequency with which these visits occurred (Fig. 6). A list of the 255 
companies and contractors enquired about can be seen in Appendix A.  At the time of interview, 256 
each farm had a median of 14 individual contractors visiting their farm per year (IQR 12-16, 257 
range 6-22) resulting in a median of approximately 67 visits per month (IQR 36-80, range 4-258 
136).   259 
The networks connecting farms varied greatly between the different companies and 260 
contractors. Many exhibited similar characteristics to the private veterinarian network (Fig. 7a) 261 
representing a few companies visiting a large proportion of the farms. Other networks were 262 
quite fragmented and had components linking 15 or less farms, such as the animal haulier 263 
network (Fig. 7b), with a greater number of companies visiting fewer farms.  264 
Farmers were asked about the organisations that went into animal areas (areas where animals 265 
are situated or have access to) and whether biosecurity was performed either at the vehicle or 266 
personnel level (always, sometimes or never) before leaving the farm.  These specific 267 
organisations were examined due to the perceived difference in transmission risk according to 268 
their on-farm role.  Those companies most likely to park in animal areas were muck spreaders 269 
(30 farms), deadstock collectors (26 farms) and hoof trimmers (17 farms).  Of these, muck 270 
spreaders cleansed and disinfected vehicles always or sometimes after visits 20% of the time, 271 
deadstock collectors 4% of the time and hoof trimmers 53% of the time.  Those companies most 272 
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likely to have personnel going into animal areas were private veterinarians (56 farms), deadstock 273 
collectors (51 farms) and farm assurance advisors (39 farms).  Of these groups, private 274 
veterinarians cleansed and disinfected themselves always or sometimes after visits 100% of the 275 
time, deadstock collectors 10% of the time and farm assurance advisors 90% of the time.  It is 276 
interesting to note that deadstock collectors figure in both groups and appear to be undertaking 277 
biosecurity infrequently in both instances. 278 
Cluster analysis was used to classify farms according to company/contractor usage (Table 2). 279 
There was little evidence of clustering when considering all companies and contractors, whereas 280 
three clusters (CC1, CC2, CC3) were evident when considering only those that entered stock 281 
areas (Table 2).  Private veterinarians visited all 56 farms and were therefore not included in the 282 
analysis.  In group CC3 all farms were visited by milk companies, hoof trimmers and farm 283 
assurance advisors; when looking at farm enterprise and farm size these farms were exclusively 284 
dairies and tended to be bigger farms than those in the other groups.  None of the farms in group 285 
CC2 were visited by trading standards officers and only a few used animal hauliers; these farms 286 
were a mixture of dairies and beef fattening farms.  A large proportion of farms in group CC1 287 
were visited by government vets, trading standards officers and animal hauliers; these farms 288 
were a mixture of dairies, beef suckler and store cattle farms.  There was no difference between 289 
the groups with regard to types of animal movements (dealers, markets, farm-farm or direct to 290 
slaughterhouse, p>0.2 in all cases) or herd size (p=0.2).   291 
 292 
3.4.3 Attitudes to biosecurity 293 
Attitudes of farmers to 19 biosecurity practices were examined by asking each farmer if they 294 
thought each practice was very useful, useful or not very useful.  A list of these biosecurity 295 
practices can be seen in Appendix B.  To explore if there were attitudinal similarities between 296 
different farmers we again used hierarchical cluster analysis.  It appeared that there were three 297 
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main groups (B1, B2, B3); group B1 were more likely to respond that the biosecurity practices 298 
were useful (n=19), group B2 were more likely to respond that the biosecurity practices were 299 
very useful (n=14) and group B3 were more likely to respond that the practices were not very 300 
useful (n=23).  This suggested three main attitudes – one tending to be very optimistic or very 301 
positive, one optimistic or positive and the other negative or ambivalent. 302 
To further explore this concept, we compared the biosecurity attitude clusters to the animal 303 
movement clusters and the company and contractor clusters.  There was no significant 304 
association between farmers attitudes to biosecurity and their animal trading patterns (p=0.3).  305 
The company and contractor groups varied with regard to their attitudes to biosecurity (p<0.1);   306 
there was a significant trend for group CC2 to have more positive attitudes towards biosecurity, 307 
compared to group CC1 (χ2 for trend p=0.04). However, no difference was detected between 308 
groups CC1 and CC3, or CC2 and CC3. 309 
 310 
3.4.4 Employees and social contacts 311 
Eighty two percent of farms employed other workers. Just under half of these farms (44%) 312 
had employees that worked on other farms and approximately 26% had employees that ran their 313 
own cattle enterprise. 314 
Social interactions which involved visiting other farms were investigated as part of the 315 
movement of people between premises. Farmers were asked to identify contacts with contiguous 316 
neighbours, and with other farms. Forty one farmers (73.2%) responded that they regularly 317 
socialised with one or more of their contiguous neighbours.  Thirty two (57.1%) farmers 318 
responded that they regularly socialised with people from other farms which were not 319 
contiguous. 320 
 321 
3.4.5 Additional premises 322 
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Fifty percent of the farmers had additional farms or other pieces of land separate to their main 323 
holding on which cattle were run. Of these 28 farms, 19 had one additional premise, five had 324 
two additional premises, two had three additional premises and two had four additional 325 
premises.  326 
 327 
3.5 Network correlations 328 
 329 
Relationships between different networks were examined using QAP correlation.  Those that 330 
showed significant similarities (p≤0.1) can be seen in Table 3.  Contiguous farms were more 331 
likely to be linked via various other types of contact. These included sharing of equipment and 332 
social interactions (p<0.001 for both).  Contiguous neighbours were also more likely to move 333 
animals using the same markets (p=0.01) and dealers (p=0.1), and to have direct farm to farm 334 
movements (p=0.02).  In addition, equipment sharing and farm-farm movements (p=0.05), 335 
equipment sharing and social interactions (p<0.001) and farm-farm movements and social 336 
interactions (p<0.001) were significantly correlated.   337 
 338 
 339 
4.  Discussion  340 
 341 
The aim of this study was to investigate the characteristics of direct and indirect contacts 342 
arising between cattle farms which may potentially facilitate pathogen transmission. Broadly, 343 
these contacts arise due to the movement of animals, people, equipment or vehicles, or due to 344 
proximity. We have identified considerable variation in these contacts and in the structure of the 345 
networks arising from these contacts.  346 
 347 
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4.1 Study design and response rate 348 
 349 
This study was set in a lowland farming area of north-west England.  Lowland farms 350 
typically have a greater number of dairy cows than in other areas of England (DEFRA, 2005b); 351 
the average number of dairy cows per holding in 2005 was 99 (DEFRA, 2006).  In 2003 the 352 
north-west region contained the highest percentage of total dairy farms in the UK (29%) when 353 
compared with the south-west (24%), the north and north-east (18%) and the south (16%) 354 
(DEFRA, 2005c).  The average number of dairy cows per farm in our study area was 220 355 
(median 170) which reflects higher dairy cow density than the overall country average.  This 356 
may result in a greater frequency of contacts than in other regions; however the types of contacts 357 
are potentially similar across the country.  Therefore it is possible that the results of this study 358 
could be extrapolated, with caution, to other dairy regions.  For areas where other types of cattle 359 
enterprise predominate it is likely that contact types and frequencies would vary, however the 360 
majority of contacts we have addressed, such as those involving animal movements, certain 361 
companies and contractors and personnel would still be likely to occur. 362 
The study achieved a good response rate.  This may be due to this area being used previously 363 
in other studies conducted by the University, or the reasonably short time commitment required 364 
of the farmers for participation.  The effect of the non-participatory farms is unknown, although 365 
the farms that did not want to take part were found to be typical of those in the area in terms of 366 
enterprise suggesting that their activities would be somewhat similar to those interviewed.  In 367 
terms of network structures the inclusion of these farms would have been invaluable in 368 
structuring more complete networks; it may be that some of the networks would be more 369 
connected with fewer, but larger, components.  Observation of partial networks is an issue in 370 
this study; interviewed farms were able to nominate farms outside of the study area and as these 371 
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were not interviewed their contacts were not included.  Such “boundary effects” are common in 372 
network analysis, particularly where a small part of a much larger population is studied.  373 
However, all parameters only refer to the behaviours of interviewed individuals in the study 374 
area; we have not used network-level parameters.  Therefore the results are valid for the 375 
population described.   376 
 377 
4.2 Types of direct contact 378 
 379 
4.2.1 Animal movements 380 
We investigated patterns of animal movement between farms and other locations. Most farms 381 
in the study area were part of a single network component, linked via markets, dealers and 382 
slaughterhouses. The market within the study area acted as a “hub” and may facilitate pathogen 383 
transmission through this area.  This network shows similar characteristics to other studies on 384 
the topology of animal movement networks within Great Britain (Robinson and Christley, 385 
2007). Although most farms traded with a single market, one farm traded with five markets, 386 
potentially increasing the exposure of the network to farms in a wider geographic area.  The 387 
trading of animals is a fundamental activity in livestock farming. However, farmers are able to 388 
make choices with regard to the mechanisms through which they trade animals. We used cluster 389 
analysis to classify farms according to their animal trading activities, resulting in three main 390 
groups. These groupings, which could not be explained by simple measures of farm type 391 
(hectarage, number of animals, enterprise), suggest that other factors such as previous 392 
experience contribute to a farmer’s decision-making process with regard to the sale and purchase 393 
of animals. Given the recent trend in the UK toward increased reliance on markets for 394 
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movement of animals and a concomitant decrease in farm to farm movements (Robinson and 395 
Christley, 2007), further investigation of the motivations underlying such decisions is warranted.  396 
This trend is concerning as it is well established that trading through markets or dealers leads to 397 
an increased risk of disease transmission; this can be due to commingling of animals from 398 
various sources or factors such as transport increasing stress levels potentially exacerbating 399 
latent disease conditions (Duncan, 1990; Barrington et al., 2006).  The fact that the majority of 400 
farms in our study area used markets to sell stock and subsequently purchased directly from 401 
other farms would be likely to reduce the disease transmission potential in this region. 402 
 403 
4.2.2 Stock on the farm not owned by the farmer 404 
Agistment of stock (i.e. the housing/feeding of animals on pasture for payment) for other 405 
farmers was not an uncommon practice. Approximately two-thirds of the agisted stock were 406 
sheep, and whilst sheep do not transmit many cattle diseases, pathogens such as Salmonella 407 
dublin and viruses causing conditions such as malignant catarrhal fever can potentially be 408 
transferred between these species. Most of the agisted animals originated within the same county 409 
or neighbouring areas. Sending sheep from upland farms to lowland farms to be away-wintered 410 
has been a common farming practice over the past 150 years in Scotland and Wales (Jones, 411 
1946); however it is difficult to find any recent studies investigating this practice.  DEFRA has 412 
reported that pathogen transmission can occur between farms due to away-wintering of sheep 413 
(DEFRA, 2005a); the disease potential risks associated with practices such as these require 414 
further investigation. 415 
 416 
4.2.3 Contiguous neighbours and boundary fences 417 
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The potential for transmission of pathogens across farm boundaries depends on many factors, 418 
including the type of perimeter fence existing between farms and stock concentrations on 419 
neighbouring farms.  Prevention of nose-to-nose contact across farm boundaries has been widely 420 
recommended as a means of improving herd biosecurity (Duncan, 1990; SAC, 2002). In the 421 
current study, while many boundary fences perceived to prevent contact actually did so, nose-to-422 
nose contact was possible with animals on adjacent farms in more than half. In most cases this 423 
contact was possible over a relatively small proportion of the total length of the fence. The effect 424 
of these contact points on the potential for disease transmission will depend on the proportion of 425 
time animals spend at fence lines and their behaviour during this time which requires further 426 
investigation. However, it is likely that such contact points reduce efficacy of these fences in 427 
terms of prevention of disease transmission.   428 
 429 
4.3 Types of indirect contact 430 
 431 
4.3.1 Equipment sharing 432 
Almost half the farmers shared equipment with other farms and importantly, tractors were the 433 
most commonly shared item, farmers reporting that tractors were most frequently used for waste 434 
handling and feeding.  This potentially increases the risk of pathogen transmission by the faecal-435 
oral route. Therefore, application of appropriate biosecurity measures may be important in 436 
limiting this mode of transmission.  Most farmers who borrowed equipment chose to clean and 437 
disinfect items only before returning them, suggesting that the cleaning process may have more 438 
to do with other factors (such as politeness) than concern over biosecurity.  It is documented that 439 
contamination of equipment with mucus, faeces and blood can harbour organisms such as 440 
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Salmonella and Mycobacterium species; it is recommended that borrowed or hired equipment 441 
should be cleaned and disinfected before it is used (Caldow et al., 1998).  Although the majority 442 
of farmers did not disclose that they shared equipment, there was evidence of underreporting of 443 
this contact, suggesting that it may be a more important route of transmission than indicated by 444 
our data.  Furthermore, many producers did not appear to undertake cleaning and disinfecting of 445 
shared equipment, increasing the potential importance of this network in facilitation of disease 446 
transmission. 447 
 448 
4.3.2 Companies and contractors and attitudes to biosecurity 449 
The number and frequency of companies and contractors visiting farms in this area was 450 
substantial, suggesting that a median farm would have (on average) more than two visits per day 451 
by personnel from an external contractor or company. Similar to the animal movement 452 
networks, the networks arising through contact with specific companies and contractors 453 
exhibited considerable heterogeneity. Several networks had only a few contractors or companies 454 
contacting many farms within the study area. Others had a more fragmented pattern, with more 455 
companies or contractors contacting only a few farms in the region. These differing patterns are 456 
likely to reflect both the geographical range of the companies’ and contractors’ activities and the 457 
differing number of farms they attend.  It is also likely that those organisations having contact 458 
with stock or going into areas where stock have access to will be of greater risk of facilitating 459 
disease than those that do not.  When considering biosecurity practices it appears that deadstock 460 
collectors could be high risk; they clean and disinfect vehicles and personnel infrequently on 461 
many of the farms in the study area and are likely to have contact with diseased animals.  The 462 
fact that muck spreaders visit more than half of the farms in the study area yet only cleanse and 463 
disinfect their vehicles infrequently is of concern considering the many diseases which are 464 
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transmitted via faecal material.  It is reassuring that private veterinarians and farm assurance 465 
advisors appeared to cleanse and disinfect on the majority of farms; these professions should act 466 
as advisors regarding disease preventative practices.  The risk posed by a company of disease 467 
transmission between farms ultimately will be a function of the number of farms visited, the 468 
probability that they act as a fomite for a particular pathogen, and their frequency and efficacy of 469 
biosecurity. 470 
Cluster analysis suggested three farm categories on the basis of company and contractor 471 
usage. Broadly, this classification system divided farms according to enterprise and farm size, 472 
although it was not possible to group farms solely using these characteristics.  This highlights 473 
the difficulties of classifying farms, differences in individual management practices and 474 
activities varying significantly between farms.  Cluster analysis allows us to categorise farms 475 
according to the types of visits they have or movements they undertake.  This approach may 476 
provide useful insight for herd health specialists in terms of disease transmission prevention and 477 
may help to inform strategies for interventions when determining legislation on issues such as 478 
biosecurity and food safety or setting restrictions during exotic disease outbreaks.  It may also 479 
help in developing categories of farm type for refinement of mathematical models of pathogen 480 
transmission.   481 
When comparing the company and contractor clusters with the biosecurity clusters, farms in 482 
CC2 tended to have a more positive attitude to biosecurity, compared to those in CC1. The 483 
farmers with the least positive attitudes to biosecurity (CC1) were those most likely to be visited 484 
by government veterinarians and Trading Standards officers; whilst those with a more positive 485 
attitude tended to be visited by fewer types of external companies and contractors.  The cause of 486 
these apparent relationships is unknown and the reasons for these associations require further 487 
investigation.   488 
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 489 
4.3.3 Employees and social contacts 490 
Most farmers in this study area employed people to work on their farms; many of these 491 
employees also worked on other farms and/or kept cattle of their own. This finding is in keeping 492 
with the current socio-economic trend in the farming community of greater numbers of part-time 493 
employees (MAFF, 1998). Although the movement of people for work may aid dissemination of 494 
ideas and innovation throughout the farming community, people may act as fomites, particularly 495 
when minimal biosecurity is performed.  In a previous study, Dutch dairy farms that employed 496 
temporary workers who worked on other farms were 3.3 times more likely to be positive for 497 
Bovine Herpes Virus 1 (van Schaik et al., 1998).  This potential risk is also present for social 498 
contacts, although there may be a low probability of disease transmission during a social visit 499 
unless animals or animal areas are frequented.  Nielen et al. (1996) in The Netherlands reported 500 
that social visits were responsible for a substantial amount of contact between livestock farms; 501 
visitors had contact with farm animals during 25% of these visits. 502 
 503 
4.3.4 Additional premises 504 
In this study, half the farms had additional premises for keeping stock and the majority of 505 
these had only one additional premise.  The use of additional farms or land parcels affects the 506 
potential for farms to be in direct contact with other farms, and may increase the geographic 507 
range of this contact, particularly when the additional premise is in a separate location to the 508 
main premise.  In our study several of the farms had additional premises adjacent to their main 509 
holding, sometimes only separated by a gate and managed as a single unit.  In this situation, the 510 
geographic range of this contact is unlikely to be increased.  511 
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 512 
4.3.5 Network correlations 513 
Whilst contiguous neighbours were clearly linked via common boundaries and general 514 
proximity, such farms were also more likely to share other contacts, such as equipment sharing, 515 
farm-farm animal movements and social interactions. This suggests that contiguous and local 516 
contacts are multi-dimensional.  Some of these relationships may be expected; farms that are 517 
contiguous are probably more likely to establish social relationships, facilitating sharing of 518 
equipment and potentially transmission of infectious agents via vehicles and personnel.  In 519 
addition, information regarding sale prices and recommendations of stock from particular 520 
sources may be communicated within these social groups.  Social contagion theory suggests that 521 
individuals can adopt the attitudes or behaviours of others in the social network with whom they 522 
communicate (Scherer and Cho, 2003); it may be this has some influence on farmer risk 523 
perception in terms of trading with particular farms, dealers and markets and even attitudes 524 
towards biosecurity.  These similar risk perceptions could, in addition, work in parallel with the 525 
cluster analysis groupings of farms with similar trade patterns and attitudes, and may assist with 526 
the development of information dissemination tools in regards to herd health and disease 527 
prevention.  Whilst the role of different contact mechanisms in pathogen transmission is 528 
pathogen specific, disentangling the components of “local contact” may suggest specific 529 
interventions to reduce transmission via this otherwise undefined mechanism. 530 
 531 
 532 
5.  Conclusion 533 
 534 
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Contact between farms on a local scale demonstrates considerable heterogeneity; variation 535 
exists between farms, between contact types and in the structure of the networks arising through 536 
these contacts. Such variation may impact on the farm-level risk of pathogen transmission. 537 
Despite this, there have been few investigations addressing these issues.   Ideally producers and 538 
herd health professionals would design tailored biosecurity programs to limit “risky” contacts on 539 
each holding.  In the UK this is, to some extent, carried out by private veterinarians, farm 540 
assurance advisors and other health professionals.  However, such programs focus only on 541 
certain endemic diseases.  Furthermore, individual farm programs are unlikely to be appropriate 542 
during exotic disease outbreaks; similarly it is difficult to design policies for utilization during 543 
epidemics that will be relevant to all farming situations.  In this study we have highlighted 544 
certain features which may be typical of other dairy areas in the UK.  We have also suggested a 545 
number of farm “types” based on contact patterns.  Studies such as these in targeted or selected 546 
areas of the country may bridge the gap between blanket recommendations and farm-level 547 
programs and may be informative for risk managers addressing exotic and endemic disease 548 
risks.  Further research is required in order to determine the extent to which these concepts can 549 





Many thanks to all the farmers involved with this project including those who assisted with 555 
the pilot study without whom this research would not have been possible.  We thank DEFRA 556 
and HEFCE for funding this project (grant VTRI VT0103).  MB received a RCVS Trust travel 557 
scholarship to present this work at the 2007 Society for Veterinary Epidemiology and Preventive 558 





Anderson, J.F., 1998. Biosecurity - A new term for an old concept - How to apply it. Bov. Pract. 563 
32, 61-70. 564 
Barrington, G.M., Allen, A.J., Parish, S.M., Tibary, A., 2006. Biosecurity and biocontainment in 565 
alpaca operations. Small Ruminant Res. 61, 217-225. 566 
Bates, T.W., Thurmond, M.C., Carpenter, T.E., 2001. Direct and indirect contact rates among 567 
beef, dairy, goat, sheep, and swine herds in three California counties, with reference to 568 
control of potential foot-and-mouth disease transmission. Am. J. Vet. Res. 62, 1121-569 
1129. 570 
Bigras-Poulin, M., Thompson, R.A., Chriel, M., Mortensen, S., Greiner, M., 2006. Network 571 
analysis of Danish cattle industry trade patterns as an evaluation of risk potential for 572 
disease spread. Prev. Vet. Med. 76, 11-39. 573 
Caldow, G.L., Crawshaw, M., Gunn, G.J., 1998. Herd health security in the suckler herd. Cattle 574 
Pract. 6, 175-179. 575 
Christley, R.M., Pinchbeck, G.L., Bowers, R.G., Clancy, D., French, N.P., Bennett, R., Turner, 576 
J., 2005. Infection in social networks: Using network analysis to identify high-risk 577 
individuals. Am. J. Epidemiol. 162, 1024-1031. 578 
Corner, L.A.L., Pfeiffer, D.U., Morris, R.S., 2003. Social-network analysis of Mycobacterium 579 
bovis transmission among captive brushtail possums (Trichosurus vulpecula). Prev. Vet. 580 
Med. 59, 147-167. 581 
DEFRA, 2005a. Reports of Salmonella in cattle. 582 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/corporate/vla/science/documents/sci-salm05-chp2-1.pdf. 583 
DEFRA, 2005b. Review of the Agricultural and Horticultural Levy Bodies - Final Report. 584 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/farm/policy/levy-bodies/pdf/levy-radcliffe-review.pdf. 585 
DEFRA, 2005c. A study of the long-term trends affecting the farming industry. 586 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/farm/policy/regulation/charge/pdf/long-term-trends.pdf. 587 
DEFRA, 2006. Analysis of recent data on dairy cows in England and implications for the 588 
environment. 589 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/farm/policy/observatory/research/pdf/observatory03.pdf. 590 
Duncan, A.L., 1990. Health security in cattle herds. In Practice 12, 29-32. 591 
Gibbens, J.C., Sharpe, C.E., Wilesmith, J.W., Mansley, L.M., Michalopoulou, E., Ryan, J.B.M., 592 
Hudson, M., 2001. Descriptive epidemiology of the 2001 foot-and-mouth disease 593 
epidemic in Great Britain: the first five months. Vet. Rec. 149, 729-+. 594 
Gilbert, M., Mitchell, A., Bourn, D., Mawdsley, J., Cliton-Hadley, R., Wint, W., 2005. Cattle 595 
movements and bovine tuberculosis in Great Britain. Nature 435, 491-496. 596 
Hanneman, R.A., Riddle, M., 2005. Introduction to social network methods. Riverside CA: 597 
University of California Riverside, CA. 598 
Jones, M., 1946. The Wintering of Hill Sheep. Proc. Nutr. Soc. 4, 58-64. 599 
MAFF, 1998. Annex B - Sustainable Food and Farming: Economic Analysis and Evidence. 600 
www.defra.gov.uk/farm/policy/sustain/pdf/workingtogether-annexb.pdf. 601 
Mikkelsen, T., Alexandersen, S., Astrup, P., Champion, H.J., Donaldson, A.I., Dunkerley, F.N., 602 
Gloster, J., Sorensen, J.H., Thykier-Nielsen, S., 2003. Investigation of airborne foot-and-603 
mouth disease virus transmission during low-wind conditions in the early phase of the 604 
UK 2001 epidemic. Atmos. Chem. Phys. 3, 2101-2110. 605 
 25 
Nielen, M., Jalvingh, A.W., Horst, H.S., Dijkhuizen, A.A., Maurice, H., Schut, B.H., 606 
vanWuijckhuise, L.A., deJong, M.F., 1996. Quantification of contacts between Dutch 607 
farms to assess the potential risk of foot-and-mouth disease spread. Prev. Vet. Med. 28, 608 
143-158. 609 
Ortiz-Pelaez, A., Pfeiffer, D.U., Soares-Magalhaes, R.J., Guitian, F.J., 2006. Use of social 610 
network analysis to characterize the pattern of animal movements in the initial phases of 611 
the 2001 foot and mouth disease (FMD) epidemic in the UK. Prev. Vet. Med. 76, 40-55. 612 
Robinson, S.E., Christley, R.M., 2007. Exploring the role of auction markets in cattle 613 
movements within Great Britain. Prev Vet Med doi:10.1016/j.prevetmed.2007.04.011. 614 
SAC, 2002. Herd biosecurity for cattle, Technical Note T502. http://www.sac.ac.uk/. 615 
Sanson, R.L., Struthers, G., King, P., Weston, J.F., Morris, R.S., 1993. The Potential Extent of 616 
Transmission of Foot-and-Mouth-Disease - a Study of the Movement of Animals and 617 
Materials in Southland, New-Zealand. NZ. Vet. J. 41, 21-28. 618 
Scherer, C.W., Cho, H.C., 2003. A social network contagion theory of risk perception. Risk 619 
Anal. 23, 261-267. 620 
Sharma, S., 1996. Applied Multivariate Techniques. John Wiley and Sons Inc Canada. 621 
van Schaik, G., Dijkhuizen, A.A., Huirne, R.B.M., Schukken, Y.H., Nielen, M., Hage, H.J., 622 
1998. Risk factors for existence of Bovine Herpes Virus 1 antibodies on nonvaccinating 623 
Dutch dairy farms. Prev. Vet. Med. 34, 125-136. 624 
Webb, C.R., 2005. Farm animal networks: unraveling the contact structure of the British sheep 625 
population. Prev. Vet. Med. 68, 3-17. 626 
Woodroffe, R., Donnelly, C.A., Jenkins, H.E., Johnston, W.T., Cox, D.R., Bourne, F.J., 627 
Cheeseman, C.L., Delahay, R.J., Clifton-Hadley, R.S., Gettinby, G., Gilks, P., 628 
Hewinson, R.G., McInerney, J.P., Morrison, W.I., 2006. Culling and cattle controls 629 
influence tuberculosis risk for badgers. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA. 103, 14713-14717. 630 
Woolhouse, M., Donaldson, A., 2001. Managing foot-and-mouth - The science of controlling 631 
disease outbreaks. Nature 410, 515-516. 632 
Woolhouse, M.E.J., Shaw, D.J., Matthews, L., Liu, W.C., Mellor, D.J., Thomas, M.R., 2005. 633 
Epidemiological implications of the contact network structure for cattle farms and the 634 





Tables  639 
Table 1: Clusters M1-M3 identified by hierarchical cluster analyses based on animal 640 
movement type using Ward’s cluster method (significance determined using χ2 test) on 641 
data collected in 2005 from 56 cattle farms in north-west England 642 

















Group M2  
(%; n=20) 
Group M3  
(%; n=19) 
P-value 
Buying from farms 
59 60 58 1.0 
Hiring from farms 
12 25 0 0.06* 
Selling to farms 
0 0 100 <0.001 
Hiring to farms 
0 0 5 0.4* 
Trading with markets 
100 85 84 0.2* 
Trading through 
dealers 0 100 42 <0.001 











Table 2: Clusters CC1-CC3 identified by hierarchical cluster analyses using Ward’s cluster 656 
method based on companies and contractors visiting 56 cattle farms in north-west England in 657 
2005 (significance determined using χ2 test) 658 





















Milk company 58 50 100 0.008 
Government veterinarians 58 4 15 <0.001* 
Trading Standards 47 0 39 0.001* 
AI technician 53 25 77 0.008 
Animal haulier 84 17 69 <0.001 
Deadstock collector 95 100 100 0.4* 
Muck spreaders 63 71 92 0.2 
Hoof trimmers 16 8 100 <0.001 
Belly clippers 0 0 7.7 0.2* 
Castrators 11 0 0 0.1* 
Farm assurance advisors 68 83 100 0.07* 
Median no. animals per farm (IQR) 151 (92-280) 140 (92-322) 238 (164-367) 0.2 
Median hectarage of farm (IQR) 59 (32-113) 59 (47-123) 117 (86-182) 0.03 
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Table 3: Matrix of relationships between contact types determined using QAP correlation from 671 
information gathered from 56 cattle farms in north-west England during 2005.  Values indicate 672 
the probability of the observed similarities, under the null hypothesis of no correlation between 673 
contact types.   674 






































































































































































            
Dealers 0.1            




0.02 0.26 0.57          
Slaughterhouses 0.31 0.76 0.88 1.00         
Equipment sharing <0.001 0.38 0.93 0.05 0.76        
AI technicians 0.3 0.77 0.48 1.00 0.52 0.03       
Deadstock 
collectors 
0.55 0.67 0.06 0.03 0.70 0.46 0.02      
Government 
veterinarians 
0.26 0.04 0.84 0.28 0.72 0.40 0.73 0.27     
Milk companies 0.01 0.76 0.24 1.00 0.08 1.00 0.002 0.14 0.93    
Private 
veterinarians 
0.13 0.68 0.20 0.60 0.65 0.54 0.12 0.83 0.62 0.43   
Social interactions <0.001 0.24 0.49 <0.001 0.23 <0.001 0.50 0.25 0.62 0.45 0.32  
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Figure captions 684 
 685 
Fig. 1: Schematic representation of potential contact characteristics of cattle farms 686 
 687 
Fig. 2: 2-mode network of animal movements between interviewed cattle farms (circles, n=55) 688 
and markets (squares, n=6), dealers (triangles, n=7) and slaughterhouses (diamonds, n=8) in 689 
north-west England during 2005 (arranged using multi-dimensional scaling) 690 
 691 
Fig. 3: (a) 1-mode network of animal movements between interviewed cattle farms (circles, 692 
n=39) and other nominated farms (not interviewed) within the north-west England study area 693 
(triangles, n=3) and outside of the study area (squares, n=39) taken from information collected 694 
during 2005. (b) Network of animal movements as in Figure 6a excluding nominated farms 695 
outside of the study area 696 
 697 
Fig. 4: Proportion of fencelines from a selection of boundary fences on 43 cattle farms within 698 
the north-west England study area allowing potential contact after farmers nominated them non-699 
contact 700 
 701 
Fig. 5: Network of equipment sharing between interviewed cattle farms (circles, n=30), other 702 
nominated farms within the north-west England study area (triangles, n=6) and outside of the 703 
study area (squares, n=9) in 2005 704 
 705 
Fig. 6: Number of visits per month by companies and contractors to each of the 56 cattle farms 706 
in the north-west England study area as nominated by farmers in 2005  707 
 30 
 708 
Fig. 7: (a) Network of private veterinarians (n=6) and (b) animal hauliers (n=18), and 709 
interviewed cattle farms (n=56 and 29 respectively) within the north-west England study area in 710 
2005.  In each case, the company or contractor (veterinarians or animal hauliers) are represented 711 
by squares and the farms by circles 712 


























































































































































































































Appendix A – List of companies and contractors 864 
 865 
Milk company*    Private veterinarians* 866 
Government veterinarians*   Trading standards* 867 
AI technician*     Animal haulier* 868 
Deadstock collector*    Vermin control 869 
Castrators*     Feed/supplement suppliers 870 
Muck spreaders*    Hoof trimmers* 871 
Belly clippers*    Hedge trimmers 872 
Silage makers     Planting/Harvesters 873 
Farm assurance advisors*   Drug company reps 874 
Fuel suppliers     Postman 875 
Trades people     Others 876 













Appendix B – Biosecurity practices 889 
1) Maintaining a closed herd 890 
2) Buying animals from a farm of known disease status 891 
3) Isolating animals moved onto a farm (including show animals) 892 
4) Testing animals which have moved on 893 
5) Using your own vehicle when transporting animals 894 
6) Cleaning and disinfecting vehicles after moving animals 895 
7) Isolating sick animals 896 
8) Minimising contact between your animals and animals on neighbouring farms e.g. 897 
double-fencing 898 
9) Not grazing different species together 899 
10) Fencing off stock access to streams and watercourses 900 
11) Not grazing animals on pastures that have been recently spread with waste (or resting 901 
pastures for an appropriate period of time before moving animals on) 902 
12) Locating animal loading areas away from where animals are situated 903 
13) Minimising the number of visitors to the farm by improving security (closing gates, 904 
seeing visitors by appointment only etc) 905 
14) Ensuring visitors change or clean clothes and boots before and after coming into contact 906 
with stock or stock areas 907 
15) Encouraging vehicles to park away from stock areas 908 
16) Seeking regular advice from vets or herd health schemes on herd issues 909 
17) Regularly carrying out pest control 910 
18) Minimising the sharing of equipment and machinery with other farms 911 
19) Minimising the use of equipment and machinery for different purposes to avoid 912 
contamination e.g. avoiding feeding with vehicles used for muck handling 913 
